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Introduction 
About five years ago Rachel was appointed a Director of a small, family-owned 
company and given a minority shareholding. She is not a member of the family, 
but she has worked for the company for many years and feels a strong loyalty to 
the founder, now in his eighties, who is still involved in the running of the firm, 
albeit in a less active capacity.  The founder¶s daughter is also a Director and 
draws a salary from the company, even though she does not actually work there.  
Rachel is seeking to grow the business and regards the founder¶s daughter¶V
salary as an unnecessary drain on resources that could be more productively used 
to employ another manager, but she also recognises that the founder is caught 
between his desire to do the best for the company he created and his obligation to 
his daughter.  What then is the wise course of action in this situation?  Rachel 
brings this quandary to the learning network of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) where she is a regular participant.  
Learning networks are typically depicted as collaborative settings capable of producing wise 
action, although the language of wisdom is not always explicit in this literature (Bessant et 
al., 2003; Pedler, 2012; Tell, 2000).  Through the sharing of insights and experiences it is 
supposed that network participants may come to learn together by reflecting on their own 
practices and those of others.  Here we are referring to learning networks in the narrower 
sense suggested by Bessant and Francis (1999, p. 377, emphasis in original) as formally 
established networks ³where the primary purpose is to enable some kind of learning to take 
place´DVRSSRVHGWR µnetworks that learn¶ where learning is a secondary activity or by-
product of (inter-)organisational arrangements that exist for other reasons (e.g. supplier 
networks, R & D collaborations).  Learning networks established for the express purpose of 
learning can take a variety of different forms depending on the convergence of interests in 
 3 
 
professional, trade, sectoral, or regional groups (Bessant & Tsekouras, 2001).  Nevertheless, 
they often share a similar philosophical orientation towards theories of learning that are 
grounded in SHRSOH¶VDFWLRQV and are cyclical in nature, as exemplified by action learning 
(Pedler & Burgoyne, 2008; Revans, 1971; 1980; 1998), experiential learning (Kolb, 1984), 
and cooperative inquiry (Heron, 1996; Reason, 1994).  Although there are important 
differences between these traditions, each assumes a cycle of learning that entails some 
variant of the familiar progression from experience, to reflection, conceptualisation, 
experimentation, and back to experience.  Action learning situates this process specifically 
within a shared social setting, where the participants become mutual protagonists in the 
dynamics of learning.  In typically colourful prose, Revans (1979, p. 8) declared that ³it is a 
cardinal postulate of action learning that those best able to help in developing the self are 
those comrades in adversity who also struggle to understand themselves; I lose the dread of 
going into my own Chamber of Horrors when I find myself opening the doors for others to 
face what may be lurking in their own.´ 
 
Although ostensibly grounded in a theory of practice, such accounts of learning cycles tend to 
enforce a strong temporal and spatial separation between reflection and action. This in turn 
encourages a dualistic orientation that separates thinking and doing, theory and practice, into 
discrete realms. By contrast, in our approach we are sympathetic to practice-based theories of 
knowing that question such sharp distinctions (e.g. Gherardi, 2000, 2006; Lave and Wenger, 
1991; Nicolini, 2012; Nicolini et al., 2003; Orlikowski, 2002). For us, knowledge and 
practice are inseparably intertwined and provisionally emerging as an actively negotiated 
soFLDODFFRPSOLVKPHQW*KHUDUGLERUURZVWKHSKUDVHµOHDUQLQJLQWKHIDFHRIP\VWHU\¶
from Turner (1991) to emphasise the situated and open-ended character of organisational 
knowing. She contrasts this with approaches to organisational learning that focus more 
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narrowly on cycles of problem-solving, which tend to treat knowledge in functionalist and 
instrumental terms. Although action learning and similar approaches are stylistically far 
removed from such a position, we nevertheless suggest that their dualistic and problem-
focused theory of practice draws them inexorably towards narrow instrumentalism. 
 
Given these limitations, our purpose in this paper is to consider how far learning networks, 
with their foundation in action learning and associated concepts, can be considered as sites 
for the generation of wise action.  Of course, this is entirely dependent upon how one defines 
wisdom.  Although wisdom has been a central preoccupation for philosophers, theologians, 
scientists and artists throughout history, it remains a significantly under-examined topic in 
organization studies, lacking any systematic application to managerial learning and practice 
(Kessler & Bailey, 2007), and only rarely exposed to empirical scrutiny (Sternberg, 1990). 
Much of the debate about wisdom has focussed on defining its essence and explaining how to 
acquire it. However, this approach tends to get stuck in definitional traps that attempt to 
distinguish between information, knowledge and wisdom as discrete categories (Bierly et al., 
2000; Levinthal, 1997). Such essentialist assumptions produce a view of wisdom as some sort 
of super-charged form of knowledge that sits at the pinnacle of a pyramid composed of data, 
information and understanding, and delivers useful outcomes. According to Labouvie-Vief 
(1990), this typically Western notion of wisdom is logos dominant in its emphasis on 
rationality, instrumentality, and accumulation. She argues it is this logos mode of knowing 
that brings stability and logical cohesion to the practice of wisdom. 
 
As a necessary complement to logos, Labouvie-Vief (1990) invokes mythos, which offers an 
altogether more narratively oriented, intersubjective and fluid way of practising wisdom that 
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emphasizes dialogue and storytelling before rational rules and immutable truths. Thus mythos 
engages with reality in ways that are fundamentally different from the paradigmatic mode of 
logos. By engaging the imagination, stories reveal poetic qualities that cannot necessarily be 
told, and as such, they complement more rational perspectives on wisdom (Weick, 2004). 
Stories are also situated and actively attached to particular, yet always shifting, social and 
material contexts. A vivid illustration of this is offered by Keith Basso (1996) in his book 
Wisdom Sits in Places. He shows that for the Western Apache people, shared knowledge is 
associated with places (physical locations), which in turn come to generate their own fields of 
meaning. These meanings are translated through storytelling, where stories not only record 
historical happenings, but also convey deeper messages about right behaviour. A wise person 
then, is someone who has visited many places and knows many stories with which to 
resource wise action. 
 
Yet another perspective is reflected in the work of Meacham (1990, p. 187), who sees 
wisdom ³QRWLQZKDWLVNQRZQEXWUDWKHU«LQKRZWKDWNQRZOHGJHLVSXWWRXVH´ This 
invites a more processual form of argument that transcends the duality of logos and mythos 
by focussing on the continuous emergence of wise action in the relational dynamics of day-
to-day activities.  Learning networks, with their emphasis on the generation of insight from 
collaborative practice, would seem to be more in tune with process-based views of wisdom 
than with the traditional notion of wisdom as a possession or characteristic to be acquired.  
While approaches such as action learning have sometimes been accused of being effectively 
atheoretical (Ashton, 2006), others argue they are based on a reasonably clear and coherent 
set of theoretical assumptions (Coghlan & Coughlan, 2010; Pedler & Burgoyne, 2008; 
Raelin, 2009).  At the heart of these is the view that learning is about actively engaging in 
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experience as an ongoing endeavour where the outcomes of previous learning episodes 
become the material for new ones.  Whether acknowledged or not, this perspective on 
learning owes a large debt to the thinking of the American Pragmatists. Their depiction of 
inquiry as a process of coping with interruptions to the flow of experience (Dewey, 1938 
[1986]; Mead, 1938) invites a processual and relational approach to the practice of wisdom 
(Simpson, 2009), portraying wise action in terms of a conflictual struggle with the 
frustrations and uncertainties of experience.  Although this is an influential trope in the 
literature on organisational knowledge and learning, there are alternative approaches that 
potentially offer different types of insight.   
 
Here we turn to Buddhist scriptures and teachings as one such alternative for exploring the 
ongoing unfolding of wise action in day-to-day practice.  Interestingly, there have already 
been oblique references to Buddhism in the literature on action learning (Boshyk & Dilworth, 
2010) and cooperative inquiry (Heron, 1996).  For example, Lessem (1997, p.88) recalls a 
conversation with Reg Revans where he said ³that Action Learning and Buddhism were one 
and the same thing.´  However, we are left guessing about the nature of the parallels between 
them.  In this paper we bring these ideas into the foreground to show how a Buddhist 
perspective can help our understanding of the practice of wisdom in learning networks, also 
illuminating some of the limitations of the implicit theoretical framing typically associated 
with these networks.  We seek to make a contribution to the literature on wise practice, not by 
reiterating the familiar criticism of rationalist logocentric perspectives, but rather by 
emphasising alternative philosophical vocabularies that can open up fresh ways of thinking 
about wisdom as a relational process.  In the next section we consider what Buddhism has to 
say about wisdom before returning in the second half of the paper to a more detailed 
H[SORUDWLRQDQGGLVFXVVLRQRI5DFKHO¶VVWRU\ 
 7 
 
 
A Buddhist perspective on wisdom 
Explicit references to Buddhist thinking occur infrequently in the organisation and 
management literature. Rare examples include Hosking¶s relational constructionism (2011), 
Weick and Putnam¶s comparison of Eastern and Western perspectives on mindfulness (2006), 
Case and Brohm¶s consideration of business ethics (2012), and a small but concentrated 
interest in Buddhism within the psychology literature on practice (e.g. Kwee et al., 2006; 
McWilliams, 2009). More often however, the influence of Buddhism is implicitly embedded 
within the subtleties of complex arguments such as Bateson¶s (1972) ecological 
understanding of the human mind, recent developments that propose compassion as an 
important and overlooked dimension of organising (e.g. Dutton et al., 2006; Frost, 1999), and 
the various writers who call for more appreciative, co-operative and participative approaches 
to understanding organisational practices (e.g. Cooperrider et al., 2000; Heron, 1996; Reason, 
1994). It seems then, that Buddhism remains an under-utilised source that may have 
considerable potential to bring new insights into the processes and practices of learning 
networks. However, any such inquiry must be undertaken tentatively and with humility, 
recognising that Buddhist wisdom can ultimately be attained only through intensive training 
and concerted effort.  
 
Of course there are many different ways of narrating Buddhist ideas; our argument is shaped 
by the form of training used in Zen Buddhism. Actively practised by one of us, this training 
involves regular meditation and a commitment to live with an awareness of certain principles 
that guide µright¶ living. There are undoubtedly differences in the training styles adopted by 
the many variants of Buddhism, but the basic teachings are common to all. These originate 
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with Shakyamuni Buddha who was born, lived and died more than 2500 years ago in the far 
north of what we now know as India. His teachings have been passed down orally and 
experientially from Master to disciple in an unbroken ancestral lineage that continues into the 
present day. Although literacy and writing were already well established at the time of the 
Buddha¶s life, this preference for oral transmission through dialogue is a characteristic that 
defines Buddhist practice. Case and Brohm (2012) suggest that spoken, rather than written 
words, are less susceptible to distortions of meaning over time.  Furthermore, a dialogical 
mode of transmission is potentially a much richer form of communication that reveals 
something of the poetics of that which cannot simply be told, more readily opening trainees 
to the full realization of enlightenment. Nevertheless, written records, known as sutras 
because they were written on palm leaves sutured together, can be dated back to about 80 
BCE (Case & Brohm, 2012). Subsequently these sutras have been widely translated, allowing 
transmission into new cultural contexts such as China, Japan, Tibet, and most recently into 
the English-speaking world.  
 
The ultimate purpose of Buddhist training is enlightenment, which has been variously 
described as peace, freedom, spiritual perfection and profound understanding that benefits all 
living things (e.g. Jiyu-Kennett, 1999), but words can never adequately capture this 
transcendent experience. Its ineffability is reflected in the following comments by the 17th 
century scholar, Hsaio Yao-Weng: 
³When there is thought without awareness, one enters the ordinary realm. When 
there is thought with awareness, one enters the realm of sages. When there is no 
thought with awareness, one enters the saintly realm. The wise understand this, 
though it is hard to express in words´ (cited in Yun & Graham, 2001, p. 67). 
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This suggests that enlightenment follows a pathway from ordinary living, to sagacity, and 
then saintliness, where this development is understood in terms of a process that 
progressively purifies body, mind, and perception (Case & Brohm, 2012). It is the third of 
these, the purification of perception, that is particularly associated with wisdom (Prajna) and 
wise, or µright¶ action. To elaborate this understanding, we draw on three particular elements, 
Dukkha, Anatta, and Anicca, from the basic teachings of Buddhism (Jiyu-Kennett, 1999).  
Dukkha is the recognition that life is permeated by suffering, which arises from human 
tendencies to crave that which we do not have. Our deluded perceptions, which lead us to 
incomplete and inaccurate beliefs about reality, are the source of our suffering, and by 
clinging to these beliefs, suffering is exacerbated. Wise action is that which reduces suffering 
by dissolving those deluded perceptions that view reality in terms of dialectical opposites, 
while enlightenment arises when these dialectics are transcended.  Anatta is the principle of 
interdependent origination, which asserts there is no individual self or independent soul. 
Failure to appreciate the interdependence of all living things causes suffering and obstructs 
wise action: 
 
³Prajna [wisdom] is perfect awareness of the unity of the self with all things. It is 
the source of all goodness and the substance of all enlightenment. Prajna is 
difficult to explain because it is a self-awareness that dissolves the self; it is a 
wisdom that is so deep it no longer has a one-pointed frame of reference´ (Yun & 
Graham, 2001, p. 78). 
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This principle resonates with the notion of the social self as presented by George Herbert 
Mead (1925, 1934) and also more recently in Hosking¶s (2011) µrelational constructionism¶ 
where she argues for a softening of the self/other distinction. For both of these writers, the 
self is socially constructed in interactions with others, and has no independent existence. The 
third element, Anicca, is the principle of impermanence, which recognises the transience of 
all lived experience. Failure to appreciate the constantly changing nature of reality is another 
source of suffering as we cling to fixed beliefs and immutable knowledge.  Wise action 
emerges as we engage with the unfolding, fluid and ephemeral processes of constructing and 
reconstructing realities. So for instance, Weick (2007, p. 11) advises us to ³accept that 
impermanence is normal and that clinging produces vulnerability´, while Chia and Holt 
(2007) promote unlearning as a way of dissolving perceived constraints. These views align 
with contemporary temporal and processual orientations towards the human activities of 
organising (e.g. Mead, 1932; Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). The principle of impermanence 
suggests then, that enlightenment should not be understood as a goal or a destination, but 
rather as a process of endless unfolding becomingness  
 
³going, going, going on beyond, and always going on beyond, always becoming 
Buddha´ (from the Heart Sutra, Morgan, 2010, p. 124) 
 
Perhaps the most sustained articulation of the Buddha¶s teachings on wisdom is to be found 
in the Diamond Sutra (the full translation of the Sanskrit title is µthe Diamond that cuts 
through illusion to the perfection of wisdom Sutra¶). Here we draw on the translation and 
commentary on the Diamond Sutra by Master Hsing Yun, a leading contemporary scholar of 
Chinese Buddhism who is a lineage holder in the ancestral transmission of Zen. Translation 
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always requires a level of interpretation, especially when it crosses cultural boundaries. In 
this case the translator, Tom Graham, worked very closely with Master Hsing Yun to produce 
an English-language text that is as near as possible to the meanings of the Chinese language 
source. This translation (Yun & Graham, 2001) has been authenticated by Master Hsing Yun.  
 
Like most sacred scriptures, the Diamond Sutra is a complex text that offers teaching on 
multiple levels. It may be understood firstly at a surface level where the phenomenal world 
that we perceive through our senses is represented in words. It is at this empirical level we 
construct concepts that allow us to express relationships between the elements of our 
perceived realities. A second level of understanding exposes what is somewhat 
problematically translated as the µemptiness¶ of this phenomenal reality. Here µemptiness¶ is 
not intended as a nihilistic denial of existence, but rather it seeks to go beyond mere words to 
reveal the hiddenness of meanings that we attach to phenomena. It concerns the no-thingness 
of things in our worlds, which are thus revealed as having a dialectical character where all 
objective µthings¶ also have an unobjectifiable emptiness. The third level of understanding 
transcends these dualistic distinctions between phenomena and their emptiness, pointing 
instead to the impermanence of all the ³forms of man or animal [which] are merely 
temporary manifestations of the life force that is common to all´ (Jiyu-Kennett, 1999, p. 8). It 
is at this level that the profound depths of the Buddha¶s teachings may be realized. Kitaro 
Nishida, a contemporary Japanese philosopher, has described this level as a place (basho) 
³completely beyond the duality of somethingness and nothingness´ (Abe, 1988, p. 366).  
 
These three levels of understanding are often expressed in the Diamond Sutra as µthree-truths 
statements¶, which take the form ³x is not x and so it is called x´ (Yun and Graham, 2001, p. 
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94). Here, µx¶ stands for phenomenal reality, and µnot x¶ stands for the emptiness of this 
phenomenal reality. The third truth, µso it is called x¶, reflects the idea that µx¶ is simply a 
label, a human construct, that we use to signify something beyond what can be represented in 
mere words. It should not be taken as some sort of absolute truth; rather, it reflects the 
fluidity and fragility of ongoing meaning-making. It is by penetrating the delusions of 
absolute reality (x) and absolute emptiness (not x) that we can come to a deep awareness 
unmediated by concepts or phenomenal world practices. Wise action then, arises by 
recognizing the mutual immanence of dualistic oppositions that separate real phenomena 
from their inherent emptinesses: 
 
³The wise understand that clarity and darkness do not have separate natures; their 
true natures are nondualistic. Deluded people make absolute distinctions between 
good and evil, between the doable and the undoable, between a good path and a 
bad path, between black dharmas1 and white dharmas, while those who are wise 
clearly understand that these pairs do not have separate natures´ (Yun and 
Graham, 2001, p. 84). 
 
What then are the lessons for learning networks in all of this? Firstly, Buddhist practice 
confirms the value of social and dialogical contexts as sites for the generation of insight. It is 
in dialogue that we come to see our selves for the interdependent, mutable and context-
specific manifestations that we really are. So, to the extent that learning networks can 
challenge our sense of self, they offer opportunities to dissolve our self-delusions. Beyond 
this, Buddhism also suggests a way to work dialogically with dualisms µ[¶DQGµQRW[¶ on 
                                                          
1 A dharma is anything that can be thought or named. A phenomenon. 
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the path to wise action. By purifying our perceptions of realities we can become aware of the 
hidden dimensions of meaning that are unspoken and unspeakable. In response to the 
question µwhat is the wise action to take in the present situation?¶ Buddhism opens up a 
µmiddle way¶ where thought with awareness admits entry into the realm of sages. We argue 
that the practice of wisdom lies on this middle path, taking the form of a continuously 
unfolding dynamic of becoming. We now reWXUQWR5DFKHO¶VVWRU\WRLOOXVWUDWHWKHVHLGHDVLQ
the ordinary everyday realms of business activity and a learning network. 
 
An empirical illustration of wisdom (or not) in practice 
Background and method 
Since 2004, the University of Brighton has initiated and managed more than 50 learning 
networks in South East England under the aegis of a programme called ProfitNet. Each 
network involves a cohort of around 15 managers from SMEs usually working in the same or 
similar business sectors (e.g. construction, manufacturing, creative industries, hospitality and 
tourism, professional services, or social enterprises), although several networks have also 
been dedicated to recent start-ups across multiple sectors.  Participation in a cohort involves a 
significant time commitment to attend monthly, three-hour meetings for 12-14 months. The 
meetings are guided by independent professional facilitators whose role is to create 
supportive conditions for dialogue, cultivate positive group dynamics, and ensure that 
everybody gets the opportunity to contribute. They are not required to be subject-experts in 
business and management, and take a relatively light touch approach to managing the 
meetings. Roughly the same pattern of activities characterises every meeting: 
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1. Business planning ± one group member presents a summary of their business 
activities, describes the opportunities and challenges faced by the company, and 
outlines their business plan.  This forms the basis for a group discussion through 
which problems are defined and possible solutions suggested.   
2. Feedback on business planning ± managers who have previously presented their 
business plans are asked to report back on their progress with implementing actions 
identified from the discussion.   
3. Action learning ± any participant may raise issues that they would like help with and 
invite suggestions about possible courses of action. The business planning part of the 
meeting also involves action learning, but with a specific focus on only one of the 
participants.   
4. Feedback on action learning ± group members recount any actions they have taken as 
a result of suggestions from previous meetings.   
 
One of us observed monthly group meetings over a six month period as a non-participant in 
ten of these networks.  The broad purpose of these observations was to throw new light onto 
the dynamics of group-based learning. The meetings were audio recorded and transcribed, 
and in addition, observations of the interactions between cohort members were noted, 
especially the structural aspects of these interactions, the use of artefacts or technologies to 
support group activities, and any non-verbal or sidebar communications.  These data have 
subsequently been subject to a range of different analytical strategies including thematic 
coding, analysis of communication structures, and interaction process analysis (see for 
instance Marshall & Tsekouras, 2010), where these strategies have been directed towards 
answering a variety of questions about group level knowledge processes. This particular 
paper arose out of a chance conversation during which we realised the potential for an 
 15 
 
interesting collaboration that brings together a rich database and a novel theoretical lens. We 
proceeded by first re-analysing the meeting transcripts and field notes to extract stories about 
the issues and challenges facing the participants and their organisations.  We focussed on the 
ways in which cohorts engaged with these issues and challenges, and the subsequent actions 
that were taken. )URPWKLVH[WHQVLYHGDWDEDVHZHVHOHFWHGDVLQJOHFDVH5DFKHO¶VVWRU\WR
illustrate how Buddhist ideas, and in particular the three elements, Dukkha, Anatta, and 
Anicca, can help in analysing the emergence of wise action in a learning network.  
Our own journey in writing this paper has been based on intense dialogue. Each of us brought 
a different expertise, one having direct and extended experience of the learning networks that 
provided an empirical opportunity, and the other bringing experientially-informed knowledge 
of Buddhist practice as a potential theoretical lens to guide our analysis. We each had to 
adopt a purposeful attitude of openness so that we were able to learn from each other. For one 
of us this meant making the space to listen properly to an unfamiliar philosophy, suspending 
doubt and moving beyond the many stereotypes that surround it. For the other, who did not 
directly experience the research setting, it was an equally intensive matter of engaging deeply 
with a landscape whose embodied realities could necessarily be communicated only through 
talk and text. This unique conjunction of experience has provided us both with fresh insights 
on group learning and a clearer understanding of the potential of Buddhist thinking for 
making sense of learning practices. 
5DFKHO¶VVWRU\2 
As described at the beginning of this paper, Rachel is concerned that valuable resource is 
EHLQJZDVWHGE\SD\LQJDVDODU\WRWKHGDXJKWHURIKHUFRPSDQ\¶VIRXQGHU6KHILUVW
mentioned this issue during the action learning phase of a meeting of her learning network 
                                                          
2
 All names used in our data presentation are pseudonyms 
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when, following the business planning presentation of another member, tKHJURXS¶V
discussion ranged over a number of themes relating to the challenges facing family 
EXVLQHVVHV+HDULQJ5DFKHO¶VFRQFHUQVWKHIDFLOLWDWRULQYLWHGKHUWRXVHWKHEXVLQHVVSODQQLQJ
section of the next meeting to provide a fuller account.  One month later then, Rachel 
presented her problem in the following terms: 
Rachel:  Mr Collins started the company in 1970.  So basically he started working and 
gradually Mrs Collins became involved.  So they became the two 
shareholders, directors, and it was like that for many years.  Different staff 
ZHUHWDNHQRQDIWHUWKDWDQGDWVRPHSHULRGRIWLPH«,¶PQRWVXUHRIWKH
DFWXDOGDWH«WKH\PDGHWKHLUGDXJKWHUDSDLGHPSOR\HHRIWKHFRPSDQ\DQG
WKHUHVKHKDVUHPDLQHGHYHUVLQFH«ZLWKWKHXVXDOVRUWRI\HDUO\VDOary 
LQFUHDVHVHWF)LYH«QRWHQ\HDUVDJRVKHZDVPDGHDGLUHFWRUDQGJLYHQ
VRPHVKDUHV)LYH\HDUVDJR,ZDVPDGHDGLUHFWRU«DELWORQJHUWKDQWKDW
actually.  I think it was about six years ago I was made a director and two 
years after that I was given a small minority shareholding.  So the real 
FRQVWUDLQWLQWKHEXVLQHVVLVWKHGDXJKWHU:LWK0UDQG0UV&ROOLQV,KDYHQ¶W
JRWDQ\JULSHVRUJULHYDQFHVDWDOOEHFDXVHWKH\¶YHZRUNHGZLWKWKHFRPSDQ\
But obviously with shelling out shares and salary the daughter has absolutely 
QRLQSXWLQWRWKHILUPZKDWVRHYHU6KHMXVWFDQQRWEHERWKHUHG6KH¶VQRWJRW
any interest whatsoever ... The other problem I had with that is the relationship 
between Mr Collins and his daughter is far from good.  So that again restricts 
ZKDWZHFDQDQGFDQ¶WGR:HGRQ¶WZDQWWRGRDQ\WKLQJWRIXUWKHUUXLQWKH
relationship between them.  It makes it very awkward.  And possibly it makes 
LWZRUVHIRUP\UHODWLRQVKLSZLWK0U&ROOLQV,PHDQ,¶YHZRUNHGZLWKWKHP
for twenty-six \HDUVDQGLQVRPHUHVSHFWVKH¶VEHFRPHPRUHOLNHD>LQGLVWLQFW
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speech] father than just a boss.  So in every other way the firm functions very 
KHDOWKLO\DQGHYHU\WKLQJHOVH6RWKDWLVUHDOO\WKHRQO\FRQVWUDLQW,¶YHJRW
$QGLIDQ\RQH¶VJRWDQ\LGHDVDQGDZD\URXQG7KHVKDUHVLVVXH,KDYHQ¶WJRW
DSUREOHPZLWKEXWLWLVVHHLQJZDVWHGVDODU\JRLQJWRVRPHERG\ZKR¶VQRW
putting any input into the firm and that could be going to someone that could 
be doing a good, useful kind of work. 
It is clear from this account that Rachel is unhappy with at least some aspects of her current 
situation; in Buddhist terms she is suffering. She is caught in a dilemma, which on the surface 
appears to be about wasting money that could be more usefully deployed elsewhere, but at a 
deeper level reflects her sense of being trapped by the dysfunctional relationship between the 
founder and his daughter. She cannot see a way of moving forward, so she does not know 
what she can do to alleviate her suffering. Rachel appears sincere when she asks the members 
of her group for their ideas, but as the conversation continues to unfold (see below) her 
unwillingness to act becomes apparent. 
 
:KHQZHSODFH5DFKHO¶VLQLWLDODFFRXQWLQWRWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHOHDUQLQJQHWZRUNGLVFXVVLRQ
that then follows, we see two clear themes emerging. Firstly, it seems that Rachel identifies 
WKHSUREOHPDVWKHIRXQGHU¶VGDXJKWHUKHUVHOIrather than as the wasted money ³the real 
FRQVWUDLQWLQWKHEXVLQHVVLVWKHGDXJKWHU´DQGIXUWKHUWKDW5DFKHOIHHOVUHVHntful towards the 
GDXJKWHUZKR³KDVDEVROXWHO\QRLQSXW´³FDQQRWEHERWKHUHG´DQGKDVQR³LQWHUHVW
ZKDWVRHYHU´7KLVVHQVHRIUHVHQWPHQWEXLOGVWKURXJKRXWWKHJURXSGLVFXVVLRQZLWK5DFKHO
GHVFULELQJWKHIRXQGHU¶VGDXJKWHUDV³DIDPLO\PHPEHUWKDWGRHVQ¶t do anything but gets a 
VDODU\´DQG³WKHSHUVRQZKRGRHVQ¶WZRUN´³,ZRXOGQ¶WPLQGLIVKHHYHUHYHQZRUNHG6KH
QHYHUKDVVHWIRRWLQWKHGRRU\RXNQRZ6KH¶VQRWGRQHDQ\ZRUNDWDOO´,QUHVSRQVHWRD
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question about whether the daughter attends board PHHWLQJV5DFKHOVD\V³6KHZRQ¶WSD\WKH
SHWUROWRFRPH´³VKHJLYHVDSRORJLHVDQGVKH¶VMXVWDEVHQWHYHU\VLQJOHWLPH´$QGZKHQWKH
JURXSVXJJHVWVOHJDOUHPHGLHV5DFKHO¶VUHVSRQVHLV³VKHLVWKHRQHWKDWZRXOGJROHJDO6KH¶V
not one that would just sit EDFNDQGVD\DKZHOO´³6KHLVYHU\FRQIURQWDWLRQDO9HU\
FRQIURQWDWLRQDO´ 
 
7KHVHFRQGWKHPHWKDWFRPHVDFURVVVWURQJO\LQWKHIXOOWUDQVFULSWLV5DFKHO¶VOR\DOW\DQG
respect for the founder, whom she always refers to formally as Mr Collins, despite having 
worked for him for twenty-VL[\HDUV,QWKHDFFRXQWDERYHVKHUHIHUVWRKLPDV³PRUHOLNHD
IDWKHU«WKDQMXVWDERVV´DQGODWHUZKHQWKHJURXSLVFKDOOHQJLQJKHUWRFRQIURQWKLPVKH
VD\V³7KDW¶VWKHWURXEOH,¶YHJRWWKRXJKEHFDXVHRIP\«,KDYHWRVDy my relationship with 
KLPLVDORWGLIIHUHQWWKDQMXVWEHLQJWKHERVV´³:HGRVSHDN\RXNQRZTXLWHRSHQO\´6KH
VWURQJO\GHIHQGVWKLVUHODWLRQVKLSVD\LQJVKHKDVQ¶W³JRWDQ\JULSHVRUJULHYDQFHV´ZLWK0U
&ROOLQV³DQ\WKLQJ0U&ROOLQVJHWVKH¶VEXLOWWKHFRPSDQ\XSLW¶VKLV´6KHLVDOVRSURWHFWLYH
RIKLPVD\LQJ³KH¶VJRWHQRXJKSUHVVXUHVDVLWLVUHDOO\,GRQ¶WZDQWWRDGGWRKLVEXUGHQ´
³KH¶VJRWDORWRIIDPLO\LVVXHVZKLFKLI\RXGRRQHWKLQJLVJRLQJWRHVFDODWHDKHOORIDORW
more for him persRQDOO\´DQG³KH¶VORDWKWRGRDQ\WKLQJEHFDXVHRIZKDWWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRQ
DSHUVRQDOOHYHOFRXOGEH´ 
 
Our interpretation of these two themes is that Rachel is creating unhelpful separations 
between herself, the founder, and his daughter, putting Mr Collins up on a pedestal where he 
can do no wrong, while his daughter is constructed as the enemy who does nothing but 
wrong. This then obliges Rachel to take sides. She suggests, for instance, that she and Mr 
Collins have colluded against his daughter as eviGHQFHGE\WKHXVHRI³ZH´LQWKHIROORZLQJ
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H[WUDFW³WKHIDFWWKDWVKHGRHVQ¶WDWWHQGPHHWLQJVEXWLIVKHKDGWXUQHGXS>ZKLOH0U&ROOLQV
was absent] and had disagreed with anything we had going on then she would actually have 
SXWD>KHVLWDWHV@ZHGLGQ¶WZDQWKHUWRKDUPDQ\WKLQJWKDWZHZHUHGRLQJ´%\FUHDWLQJWKHVH
divisions, Rachel is failing to recognise the interdependence of all three protagonists, the fact 
that they are really all in it together. In Buddhism, suffering arises when we try to construct 
RXUVHOYHVDVLQGHSHQGHQWHQWLWLHVVR5DFKHO¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQWRUHLQIRUFHWKHVHGLVWLQFWLRQVLV
simply exacerbating her discomfort with the whole situation. To resolve her suffering, she 
must be prepared to move beyond the thingness of resentment and loyalty to explore the 
unspoken no-thingness of these relationships, opening up new ways of seeing them. 
 
A third theme that does not come out as strongly in the transcript, but is nevertheless useful in 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ5DFKHO¶VH[SHULHQFHRIVXIIHULQJLVWKH long term temporality of family 
businesses. She remarks that the current situation in her company is the result of actions taken 
ORQJDJR³LW¶VVRKLVWRULFLW¶VDOZD\VEHHQGRQHWKDWZD\2EYLRXVO\0U&ROOLQVLVVWLOOLQ
place [as an obstacle to change]´³LW¶VEHHQOLNHLWIRUWKHODVW«HYHUVLQFHWKHFRPSDQ\«
HYHUVLQFHVKH¶VEHHQROGHQRXJKWRUHFHLYHDVDODU\´2WKHUPHPEHUVRIWKHOHDUQLQJQHWZRUN
recognise this situation from their own experience. For instance Bill accepts the need for 
overhead pD\PHQWVPDGHE\WKHIDPLO\EXVLQHVVWRKLVUHWLUHGSDUHQWV³:HOOZHFDQOLYH
ZLWKWKDWWLOOWKH\GLH´,QWKHPHDQWLPH5DFKHOLVUHVLJQHGWRWKHUHEHLQJOLWWOHRUQRFKDQJH
³,QWLPH,NQRZLWZLOOVRUWLWVHOIRXW´³0U&ROOLQVLVVWLOOLQYROYHGLQWKHILUPDOWKRXJKLW¶V
not day-to-GD\LQYROYHG´7KHVXJJHVWLRQKHUHLVWKDWLI5DFKHOMXVWVLWVWLJKWWKHQWKH
problem will be solved one way or another. The trouble is, her situation is tenuous: 
Kevin:  :KDW¶VJRLQJWRKDSSHQZKHQ0U&ROOLQVGLHV 
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Rachel:  :HOO,¶PQRWVXUHEXW,EHOLHYH«>ODXJKV@«,W¶VRQHRIWKRVHWKLQJV
WKDW¶VQHYHUEHHQRXWULJKWO\SXWRQWKHWDEOHDVLWZHUHEXW,EHOLHYHWKDW
myself and the daughter will get 50% shares. 
This sense of suspension in time contravenes the Buddhist principle of impermanence, which 
acknowledges the perpetually unfolding nature of experience. By remaining stuck in history, 
and waiting for future events to initiate change, suffering is inevitable. Rachel needs to 
explore the no-thingness of any perceived sources of resistance to movement and change. 
 
The question then, is how can the learning network assist Rachel in becoming more aware of 
the no-thingnesses of her situation, and thereby facilitate wise action? The group members 
certainly offer her a ORWRIJRRGDGYLFHDERXW'LUHFWRUV¶UHVSRQVLELOLWLHVXQGHUWKHODZDQG
options for financial restructuring of the company, but perhaps more importantly, several 
group members can empathise through very similar situations in their own family businesses.  
Bill:  My co-GLUHFWRUVWDUWHGZLWKXVILYHRUVL[\HDUVDJRDQGKH¶VKDGWRDFFHSWWKDW
RQHRIWKHPDMRURYHUKHDGVLVSD\LQJIRUP\SDUHQWV«KHDFFHSWVWKDWWKHUHLV
WKLVVRUWRIWKLQJWKDWLWZDVP\IDWKHU¶VEXVLQHVVDQGKHVWLOOGHVHUYHVWRKDYH
something.   
And in another example: 
Kevin:  KLVWRULFDOO\,¶YHKDGPHPEHUVRIWKHIDPLO\ZLWKLQWKHFRPSDQ\,FDQ¶W
DIIRUGWRSD\\RXUVDODU\,FDQ¶WDIIRUGWRSD\WKLV«XQWLO\RXJHWLWGRZQWR
the point where you mutually agree a lesser amount.  EffecWLYHO\\RXNQRZ«
VKHDFFHSWV«,ZRXOGNHHSKHULQWKHFRPSDQ\DFWXDOO\QRWEHFDXVHWKH
company needs her, but because it keeps her alive.  It gives her a sense of 
SXUSRVHDQGWKDW¶VWKHRQO\UHDVRQ,GRLW,¶YHQRWGLVFXVVHGLWZLWKKHUEXW
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the fact LVZLWKRXWWKDWVKHZRXOGKDYHKDGIDUOHVV«0RVWSUREDEO\VKH¶GEH
VLWWLQJDWKRPHIHHOLQJVRUU\IRUKHUVHOI6KHVD\VVKHGRHVQ¶WKDYHDIDQWDVWLF
OLIHRXWVLGHEXWVKH¶VJRLQJRIIRQDFUXLVHWR(J\SWLQWZRPRQWKV¶WLPH 
 
Although these situations DUHVLPLODUWR5DFKHO¶VLQHDFKFDVHWKHUHLVDQDFFRPPRGDWLRQRI
multiple loyalties rather than grasping for a single reductive logic. Bill acknowledges there is 
more to business than minimising overheads, while Kevin appears to appreciate the wider 
benefits that accrue by making payments to inactive family members. He does express a mild 
resentment about a cruise holiday taken at the expense of the company, but this is nowhere 
QHDUWKHOHYHORIDQWDJRQLVPWKDW5DFKHOGLUHFWVWRZDUGVWKHIRXQGHU¶VGDXJKWHr.  For both 
Bill and Kevin doing good business is more than narrow financial calculations and, as long as 
the resources provided can be negotiated to an acceptable level, it is possible to reach a 
compromise between the demands of the company and the needs of the family. Other 
members of the group join in to emphasise the importance of negotiation in acknowledging 
and navigating the inescapable interconnectedness of family and business in these types of 
firms.  However, when they try to draw Rachel out on the problems of negotiation, she 
repeatedly stonewalls them, and disengages from the conversation: 
Nigel:  6RZK\GRQ¶W\RXJRWRKLPDQGVD\ORRN\RX¶YHJRWWRVRUWWKLVRXWQRZ
7KHUH¶VFRQIURQWDWLRQ7KHUH¶VFRQIURQWDWLRQZLWK\RXRUFRQIURQWDWLRQZLWh 
his daughter.  So he has confrontation one way or the other. 
Rachel: Yeah [slowly]. 
And again: 
Bill:  ,DSSUHFLDWHLW¶VDGLIILFXOWVLWXDWLRQEXW\RXPD\KDYHWRIRUFHKLPWRPDNHD
decision. 
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Rachel:  0PPP« 
And again: 
Margaret:  He might understand youUSRVLWLRQPRUHLI\RXH[SODLQ« 
Rachel:  Yeah. 
And again: 
Bill:  The best thing is to be a bit more worried about the future than the present 
then because your position could be completely undermined by the fact that 
SHUKDSVKHKDVQ¶WPDGH«LIKHKDVPDGHDZLOOKHKDVQ¶WPHQWLRQHGWKH
shares or anything like that.  She suddenly wins 80% extra. 
Rachel:  Yeah [quietly]. 
Bill:   (LWKHU\RX¶UHKLVWRU\WKHFRPSDQ\¶VKLVWRU\RU« 
Rachel:  Yeah. 
5DFKHO¶VUHVLVWDQFHWRJHWWLQJLQWRFRQYHUVDWLRQZLWKWKHIDPLO\ is starkly evident here: 
Nigel:   Have you talked to her at all? 
Rachel:  Her? 
Nigel:   Yeah. 
Rachel:  1RWRQWKLVVXEMHFWQR1RWKHUH¶VQRSRLQWZKHUHLW¶VEHHQEURDFKHGDWDOO 
 
2XULQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHJURXS¶VGLVFXVVLRQLVWKDWWKHUHLV a forbidden topic, an elephant in 
the room that cannot be mentioned. The learning network never goes there, and indeed, there 
is little to suggest that either the group members or the facilitator are aware of any 
dimensions beyond the immediate thingness of the situation and its surface phenomena. They 
GRQRWDWWHPSWWRSUREHPRUHGHHSO\LQWR5DFKHO¶VUHODWLRQVKLSVZLWKWKHIRXQGHUDQGKLV
daughter, and they do not break through her perception of the concreteness and permanence 
of her situation. Rather, they focus on providing sound, rational business advice based on 
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their own experiences. It is, of course, perfectly possible that Rachel may have derived 
insights from this conversation that she was later able to reflect on, and use to modify her 
practice in the business. However, two months later, when the facilitator asked whether she 
had anything further to report, her response was: 
  
Rachel: I haven¶t got a great deal because we¶ve been absolutely choc-a-block at work 
>«@2WKHUWKLQJVXQIRUWXQDWHO\KDYH«ZHOOQRW unfortunately because they 
are actually in my way of thinking business-wise more important to sort out at 
WKHPRPHQWVR«,W¶s all there.  It¶s all looked at and it¶s up to me to then 
make the decision to what I say and how I say it and how we¶re going to 
UHVROYHLW>«@,W¶s just it¶s the family connection.  That¶s the hardest one to 
tackle.  Not wanting to put any extra complication there that needn¶t be there.  
That¶s really all I can tell you because I haven¶t taken things further. 
Indeed, as we write this, some six years after these data were collected, the public 
information for the company shows that Mr Collins, his daughter, and Rachel remain as 
Directors, and sole shareholders.  
 
Discussion 
In this paper, we set out to explore the extent to which learning networks might support wise 
action and the practice of wisdom more generally. While we recognise the diversity of 
approaches towards, and theories about, action learning (see e.g. Marsick & O'Neil, 1999; 
Pedler, 1997; Pedler et al., 2005; Simpson & Bourner, 2007), the ProfitNet programme that 
provides our empirical example has been shaped by a particular reading that is fairly 
traditional in its orientation.  That is to say, the learning network is understood as a 
collaborative set in which members help each other to navigate their way through repeated 
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cycles of learning that start by bringing their experiences to the group, then reflecting on 
these together, creating new understandings of the situation, and experimenting with these 
new insights, thus generating further learning loops (c.f. Kolb, 1984; Lewin, 1948, 1951). We 
argue that the theory of practice implicit in this formulation, along with its rather narrow and 
instrumental focus on problem-solving, ultimately limits the capacity of the learning network 
to help generate wise action beyond the realm of the immediately technical.  
 
Rather than questioning whether the learning cycle concept itself and the type of learning it 
promotes are adequate, the network functions to identify and remove perceived blockages 
that prevent learning. For example, the architects of ProfitNet (Bessant & Tsekouras, 2001) 
have identified a number of potential impediments that may cause this cycle of action to get 
͚stuck͛. These include superficial or inadequately structured reflection, an insufficiency of 
new ideas from the group, or an unwillingness to take the risks of experimentation. Thus the 
impetus for the learning set is to remove any such blockages so that the cycle of action and 
experience may be continued. We argue however, whilst such actions may be ͚effective͛ in 
terms of solving perceived problems, they do not necessarily constitute wise action, which we 
have characterised as a continuously unfolding dynamic of becoming, a ͚going on͛ that 
alleviates suffering.  
 
From the perspective of orthodox action learning theory, Rachel͛s inaction could be 
understood as a fairly straightforward matter of failed implementation due to fear, anxiety, or 
a lack of preparedness for the group process (Beaty et al., 1993; Bourner, 2011; Breathnach 
& Stephenson, 2011; Linklater & Kellner, 2008; Marquardt, 2004). However, by refracting 
Rachel͛s story through the lens of Buddhist thinking we come to a rather different diagnosis 
that suggests different remedies. Rachel is now understood to be suffering (Dukkha), and the 
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source of her suffering is twofold. Firstly by constructing Mr Collins and his daughter as 
separate from her sense of her own self she is contravening the principle of interdependent 
origination (Anatta), which would suggest that her suffering is not hers alone. By implication 
then, she will never be able to alleviate her suffering by isolating herself from the suffering of 
others. Secondly, by suspending further action until Mr Collins͛ eventual demise she is 
denying the principle of impermanence (Anicca), which recognises the transitory nature of all 
existence and the need to find ways of ͚going on͛ and ͚always becoming͛. The solution to 
these delusions of separation and stasis is to pay attention to the no-thingness of her situation, 
which might suggest a multiplicity of alternative ways of re-construing her relational and 
temporal experience. Although she gives numerous signals about her relationship with the 
founder (reverential) and his daughter (resentful), these are never opened up for deeper 
discussion.  The group does offer Rachel a range of practical (and less practical) strategies for 
dealing with the superficial thingness of her situation, but in so doing the members focus on 
what she is able (prepared) to discuss at the expense of what is arguably the underlying cause 
of her suffering.  
 
By concentrating on the ͚problem͛ as Rachel presents it, any real appreciation of the no-
thingness of her situation is evaded. Had the group been able to help Rachel acknowledge the 
emptiness of her perceived reality she would potentially have had access to a richer repertoire 
of possible actions to guide her in acting wisely. Instead, the dynamics of her entanglement in 
the learning network push the group towards focusing on the narrow, phenomenal thingness 
of Rachel͛s problem instead of appreciating the deeper implications of the no-thingness of her 
relationship with the founder and his daughter. This narrowing of focus is further shaped by 
the nature of engagement used in the learning network. Through their communication, the 
different participants bring their own lifeworld experiences into the network, but there are 
 26 
 
limits to the communicability of such experiences across these alternative fields of practice. 
There are moments when some of the members seem to approach a deeper appreciation of 
Rachel͛s dilemma, such as when Bill and Kevin draw on their own similar experiences to 
connect and empathise with her situation. Here there is what Gadamer (2004) refers to as 
Horizontverschmelzung; a fusion or merging of horizons where understanding emerges from 
the connection between different backgrounds and trajectories of experience. However, 
learning networks do not reliably produce such fusions; indeed, we argue that the dynamics 
of Rachel͛s learning network ultimately curtailed such a process. 
 
By failing to engage with the underlying FDXVHVRI5DFKHO¶VVXIIHULQJWKHSUDFWLFDOO\-oriented 
advice of the learning network encourages her to take actions that arguably prevent her from 
µJRLQJRQ¶6KHLVLQWKHSDUDGR[LFDOSRVLWLRQZKHUHHYHQLIVKHGLGWDNHDFWLRQDORQJWKH
OLQHVUHFRPPHQGHGE\WKHJURXSVKHZRXOGVWLOOUHPDLQµVWXFN¶LQKHUVXIIHULQJ7KLVUDLVHV
interesting questions about the nature of action, and challenges some of the typical 
assumptions underpinning action learning.  Clearly action is a central concept in this 
literature, yet it has remained surprisingly under-theorised, a neglect justified by the desire to 
avoid being too prescriptive about what action learning is for fear of damaging the orientation 
towards openness and experimentation that is supposed to be at its heart (Revans, 1979; 
Simpson & Bourner, 2007).  Ashton (2006) has suggested the theory and practice of action 
learning often adopts a quite simplistic and common-sense notion of action as activity.  As a 
result, it prioritises an agentic view of action in which people do things to achieve 
instrumental ends (regardless of whether those ends are achieved or not).  Action learning is 
thus understood in terms of an action / inaction dualism. Without action there can be no 
learning.  Action provides the material for reflection, and creates the basis for further action 
(Revans, 1998; Schön, 1983).  In this context, inaction is a dysfunction that blocks learning. 
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Vince (2008) argues that such inaction arises from emotional and political dynamics that 
reflect often unconscious social and psychological assumptions. Unless these assumptions are 
uncovered, learning networks may collude to avoid those actions that produce anxieties and 
antagonisms. He goes on to suggest other dynamics that also hinder learning: 
 
7KHFHQWUDOLGHDLQDFWLRQOHDUQLQJLVWKDWWDNLQJµDFWLRQ¶LVWKHNH\WROHDUQLQJ
OHDUQLQJE\GRLQJ«,QDGGLWLRQWRWDNLQJDFWLRQWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQRIOHarning also 
involves: making inaction (reducing the scope of learning-in-action); organizing 
action (prioritizing action over reflection/action, which leads to inaction); and settling 
for action (acting for the sake of action and at the expense of learning). (Vince, 2008, 
p. 103). 
 
,Q5DFKHO¶VFDVHKHUfailure WRFRQIURQWWKHVLWXDWLRQFRXOGEHLQWHUSUHWHGDVµPDNLQJ
LQDFWLRQ¶ZKHUHE\WKHG\QDPLFVRIWKHJURXSGLVFXVVLRQVIDLOWRUHPRYHWKHEORFNDJHWKDWLV
preventing her from acting.  However, we argue that even if this blockage is removed, Rachel 
ZRXOGVWLOOEHVXEMHFWWRµRUJDQL]LQJDFWLRQ¶RUµVHWWOLQJIRUDFWLRQ¶LQZKLFKWKHV\PSDWK\
and advice from the group might HQFRXUDJHKHUWRWDNHDFWLRQIRUDFWLRQ¶VVDNHEXWDWWKH
expense of deeper reflection. 
 
A Buddhist perspective goes beyond this simple distinction between action and inaction, 
emphasising instead the never-HQGLQJQHVVRIµJRLQJRQ¶:KDWLVLPSRUWDQWKHUHLVWKHTXDOLW\
of this continuous movement, the complex interplay between phenomenal µWKLQJQHVV¶WKH
HPSWLQHVVRIµQR-WKLQJQHVV¶DQGWKHTXHVWIRUZLVGRP beyond that which we can signify in 
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mere words. As such, it is not action that solves a problem simply by affording a different 
perspective, but rather it is insight into the no-thingness of a situation that ultimately leads to 
wise action. From this perspective, the practice of wisdom is neither an outcome nor a goal, 
but rather a continuously emergent flow of becoming (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002).  By 
emphasising the impermanence of everything, Buddhist practice encourages us to examine 
what we do rather than what we have; how we use knowledge rather than what knowledge we 
have accumulated (Meacham, 1990).  Extending the metaphor of flow, we can understand 
that the practice of wisdom may itself be either turbulent or smooth.  The ultimate purpose of 
Buddhist training is a smooth flow that continues unperturbed by circumstances. This is 
perhaps an unattainable condition, but there is much to learn on the journey towards it.  
Turbulence offers opportunities for learning and readjusted actions as suggested, for instance, 
E\WKHSUDJPDWLVWQRWLRQRIµIHOWGLIILFXOWLHV¶WKDWGULYHLQTXLU\(Dewey, 1922, 1938), or the 
breakdowns that Heidegger (1962) saw as prompts to a different mode of being.   
 
We conclude then, that the action / inaction dualism underpinning learning networks such as 
ProfitNet tends towards instrumental problem solving rather than the practice of wisdom. 
However, there are other forms of action-based learning and development that come closer to 
the Buddhist ideas we have articulated. For instance Appreciative Inquiry (AI) complements 
more humanist approaches to co-operative and participative action. Hosking (2011) asserts 
that AI draws on a different philosophical foundation that is constructionist, relational, and 
dialogical (see also Boydell & Blantern, 2007). Here ͚dialogue͛ refers to a particular style of 
talk that emphasises active listening and being fully present in a way that is reminiscent of 
both Buddhist practice and some of the early Communities of Practice literature (Lave & 
Wenger, 1991). A distinguishing quality of AI is its commitment to transformative and 
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generative change that invites ongoing improvisation and the emergence of new ways of 
seeing (Cooperrider & Srivastva, 1987). However Bushe and Kassam (2005) have 
demonstrated that AI does not always accomplish this transformative potential, which may be 
explained at least in part by the fact that, like other approaches to action learning, AI is based 
on a closed cycle that traverses the four Ds of Discovery, Dreaming, Designing, and Destiny. 
Buddhism offers an alternative view that focusses on ͚going on͛ rather than ͚going round͛.  
 
The approach that we have presented here invites further research to investigate how this 
Buddhist notion of ͚going on͛ might enhance the transformative potential of learning 
networks. It engages with practical questions about the temporal and social dynamics of the 
day-to-day practices within organizations, questions which in turn call for research methods 
that go beyond the representationalism and instrumentality that characterize much of the 
organizational literature (Tsoukas, 1998). Building a theoretical case for an anti-dualist 
process orientation in the study of organizations is important, but the challenge is to support 
this with ways of researching and writing that are in tune. This is easier said than done and, as 
such, this is a key area for further development. We are conscious that, in presenting our 
argument, our language has been peppered with dualisms: action vs inaction; theory vs 
practice; temporal vs spatial; logos vs mythos; thingness vs no-thingness; and so on. This is 
unavoidable as drawing binary distinctions is a key feature of our language and such 
categorisation is necessary in making sense of the world around us. The problem comes when 
we are unable to see these categorical representations for what they are; as products of 
language rather than fixed features of reality. Dualisms are problematic because they can 
easily become hypostasised and work against more fluid and flexible movements in 
understanding. This is precisely the challenge that Buddhist thinking grapples with ʹ it seeks 
non-representational ways of understanding that can better engage with the processual ͚going 
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on͛ of human experience. It acknowledges, celebrates even, the opposites and separations that 
come with our use of dualisms, but works with them in a different way so that they do not 
end up entrapping us. We suggest that this alternative view is relevant not only for our 
understanding of wise action, but also as a way of engaging more widely with the dynamics 
of organizational practice. There is much to be gained by transcending the thingness of 
dualistic thinking in order to gain a deeper appreciation for the flow of living. 
 
In sum, the contributions that we seek to make in this paper are twofold. Firstly we have 
suggested important limitations to the ability of learning networks to produce wise action, 
which we have conceived here DVDIRUPRIµJRLQJRQ¶WKDWDOOHYLDWHVVXIIHULQJ. The cycle of 
learning that informs the practices of learning networks is certainly useful for problem 
solving at the level of phenomena, but it does not provide ready access to other (deeper) 
levels of human experience. In this respect, learning networks are limited in the extent to 
which they can engage with the unseen emptiness of situations. Our second contribution is to 
offer Buddhist thinking as an alternative vocabulary for exploring the practice of wisdom.  
By taking a less familiar path, we hope to unsettle some of the presumptions that keep us 
stuck in our habitual ways of thinking about, and theorizing wise action. In particular, we 
propose that there is considerable merit in approaching wisdom, not as an accumulation of 
knowledge, but as an ongoing process of engaging with the never-ending stream of thorny 
problems thrown up by life, for which solutions are not obvious and wise actions remain 
elusive.  
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